| Description |
In this paper we use quantitative and qualitative data to examine the influence that professional advice has on business compliance: is it true that the more professional advice a business receives about compliance with the law, the more it complies with the law? Or is seeking advice from lawyers associated with an adversarial, game-playing approach to regulators and regulatory compliance? Our quantitative data 1 8 allow us to address these questions because they capture business commitments to compliance and use of lawyers from the business' point of view. Because our quantitative data do not derive from lawyer reports about their own behaviour, we believe our findings are particularly robust regarding how lawyers act. Our survey interrogates businesses about lawyers, rather than asking lawyers to testify about themselves. Our qualitative interview and documentary data from lawyers, businesses, and regulatory enforcement staff give us the context to interpret the quantitative data meaningfully...We find that neither thesis applies to the market for corporate legal services. The devolution thesis fails to recognize that clients vary in their attitudes towards law and legal risk. As a result of client demand, a significant portion of what lawyers supply is a service as compliance monitors. The professionalism thesis fails to recognize that norms of legal professionalism support lawyers' action as gamesters and adversarial advocates. As a result, even when clients demand lawyers who act as compliance monitors, lawyers supply services that incline clients to increasingly accept legal risk and adopt a gamester approach to law and regulation. (Description from Source) |